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ApeX Pro is a non-custodial trading platform that delivers limitless cross-margined perpetual contracts trading.


Value secured
$38.07 M1.16%
Canonically Bridged
$38.07 M
Natively Minted
$0.00
Externally Bridged
$0.00

  • Tokens
  • Past day UOPS
    0.873.48%
  • 30D ops count
    2.32 M
  • Type
    Validium

  • Purpose
    Exchange
  • Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

    Badges

    About

    ApeX Pro is a non-custodial trading platform that delivers limitless cross-margined perpetual contracts trading.

    Recategorisation

    101d
    02h
    28m
    04s

    The project will be classified as "Other" due to its specific risks that set it apart from the standard classifications.

    The project will move to Others because:

    The data availability committee threshold is too low

    Consequence: projects with a low DAC threshold rely on the honesty of few entities to safely attest data availability on Ethereum. These entities can collude with the proposer to finalize an unavailable state, which can cause loss of funds.

    Learn more about the recategorisation
    Value Secured

    2024 Mar 09 — 2025 Mar 09

    Activity

    2024 Mar 09 — 2025 Mar 08

    Milestones & Incidents

    ApeX Pro public beta launched

    2022 Nov 21st

    ApeX Pro beta is launched, with incentives program for users.

    Learn more

    ApeX Pro live on Mainnet

    2022 Aug 31st

    ApeX Pro, a non-custodial decentralized exchange is now live on Mainnet.

    Learn more
    Detailed description

    ApeX Pro is a non-custodial trading platform that delivers limitless cross-margined perpetual contracts trading.

    ApeX Pro is running two independent StarkEx instances, one for USDC and one for USDT, but that technical distinction is not visible to the user.

    Risk summary
    Risk analysis
    Sequencer failureState validationData availabilityExit windowProposer failure

    Sequencer failure

    Force via L1

    Users can force the sequencer to include a trade or a withdrawal transaction by submitting a request through L1. If the sequencer censors or is down for 7d, users can use the exit hatch to withdraw their funds. Users are required to find a counterparty for the trade by out of system means.

    State validation

    ZK proofs (ST)

    STARKs are zero knowledge proofs that ensure state correctness.

    Data availability

    External (DAC)

    Proof construction relies fully on data that is NOT published onchain. There exists a Data Availability Committee (DAC) with a threshold of 3/5 that is tasked with protecting and supplying the data.

    Exit window

    None

    There is no window for users to exit in case of an unwanted regular upgrade since contracts are instantly upgradable.

    Proposer failure

    Use escape hatch

    Users are able to trustlessly exit by submitting a Merkle proof of funds. Positions will be closed using the average price from the last batch state update.

    Technology

    Validity proofs ensure state correctness

    Each update to the system state must be accompanied by a ZK proof that ensures that the new state was derived by correctly applying a series of valid user transactions to the previous state. These proofs are then verified on Ethereum by a smart contract. The system state is represented using Merkle roots.

    1. Enforcing Consistency on the On-Chain State - StarkEx documentation

    Zero knowledge STARK cryptography is used

    Despite their production use zkSTARKs proof systems are still relatively new, complex and they rely on the proper implementation of the polynomial constraints used to check validity of the Execution Trace.

    • Funds can be lost if the proof system is implemented incorrectly.

    1. STARK Core Engine Deep Dive

    Data is not stored on chain

    The balances of the users are not published onchain, but rather sent to external trusted parties, also known as committee members. A state update is valid and accepted onchain only if at least a quorum of the committee members sign a state update.

    • Funds can be lost if the external data becomes unavailable (CRITICAL).

    • Users can be censored if the committee restricts their access to the external data.

    1. Data Availability Modes - StarkEx documentation
    2. Validium - StarkEx documentation
    3. Availability Verifiers - StarkEx documentation
    Data availability

    Set of parties responsible for signing and attesting to the availability of data.

    Risk analysis
    DA Layer Risks
    Economic security
    None

    There are no onchain assets at risk of being slashed in case of a data withholding attack, and the committee members are not publicly known.

    Fraud detection
    None

    There is no fraud detection mechanism in place. A data withholding attack can only be detected by nodes downloading the full data from the DA layer.

    DA Bridge Risks
    Committee security
    3/5

    The committee does not meet basic security standards, either due to insufficient size, lack of member diversity, or poorly defined threshold parameters. The system lacks an effective DA bridge and it is reliant on the assumption of an honest sequencer, creating significant risks to data integrity and availability.

    Upgradeability
    Immutable

    The bridge smart contract is immutable and cannot be updated. The bridge committee security is low and cannot be improved.

    Relayer failure
    Self propose

    Anyone can relay data availability commitments to the DA bridge. In case of current relayer failure, users can collect attestations from committee members and propose new data availability commitments to the DA bridge.

    Technology

    Architecture

    starkex architecture

    The Starkware application utilizes a data availability solution that relies on a Committee Service to ensure data persistence. This architecture comprises the following components:

    • Availability Gateway: The primary interface provided by the operator for committee members to access new batch information and submit signed availability claims.
    • Data Availability Committee (DAC): A group of nodes responsible for storing state data associated with each Merkle root and attesting to data availability by signing claims.
    • Data Batches: Collections of transactions processed in batches that update the state of accounts, resulting in a new Merkle root representing the updated state.

    Committee members run services that interact with the Availability Gateway to obtain information about new batches and submit their signed availability claims. Each batch includes a unique batch_id, a reference to a previous batch, and a list of account updates. Committee members combine this information with data from the reference batch to compute the new state and verify the Merkle root.

    When the operator produces a new batch, it must be signed by a minimum number of committee members—as defined by the application’s configuration—for it to be accepted onchain. This includes all members designated as mandatory signers. If the operator attempts to submit a batch without the required signatures, it will be rejected, thereby ensuring that data remains available and consistent.

    Committee members are expected to maintain a database that stores the data associated with each batch, making use of storage solutions with a replication factor of at least 2.

    DA Bridge Architecture

    starkex bridge architecture

    The DA commitments are posted to the destination chain, using the Committee Verifier contract as a DA bridge. The DA commitment consists of a data hash of the transaction batch the Committee has signed off on and a concatenation of ec-signatures by signatories.

    The Committee Verifier contract verifies the signatures and the data hash and if the required threshold of Committee members has signed off on the data, the hash is stored as a registeredFact in the StarkEx contract. In a separate transaction, the operator calls the updateState() function on the StarkEx contract to update the state. Before the state update is accepted, the StarkEx contract verifies the transaction public inputs by calling the isValid() function, which verifies the hash derived from state update inputs matches the hash stored by the Committee Verifier contract.

    • Funds can be lost if a malicious committee signs a data availability attestation for an unavailable transaction batch.

    1. StarkEx Committee Service - Source Code
    Operator

    The system has a centralized operator

    The operator is the only entity that can propose blocks. A live and trustworthy operator is vital to the health of the system. Typically, the Operator is the hot wallet of the StarkEx service submitting state updates for which proofs have been already submitted and verified.

    • MEV can be extracted if the operator exploits their centralized position and frontruns user transactions.

    1. Operator - StarkEx documentation

    Users can force exit the system

    Force exit allows the users to escape censorship by withdrawing their funds. The system allows users to force the withdrawal of funds by submitting a request directly to the contract onchain. The request must be served within 7d. If this does not happen, the system will halt regular operation and permit trustless withdrawal of funds. Perpetual positions can also be force closed before withdrawing, however this requires the user to find the counterparty for the trade themselves.

    • Users can be censored if the operator refuses to include their transactions. However, there exists a mechanism to independently exit the system.

    • Funds can be lost if the user is unable to find the counterparty for the force trade.

    1. Censorship Prevention - StarkEx documentation
    2. Forced Trade - StarkEx documentation
    Withdrawals

    Regular exit

    The user initiates the withdrawal by submitting a regular transaction on this chain. When the block containing that transaction is settled the funds become available for withdrawal on L1.ZK proofs are required to settle blocks. Finally the user submits an L1 transaction to claim the funds.

    1. Withdrawal - StarkEx documentation

    Forced exit

    If the user experiences censorship from the operator with regular exit they can submit their withdrawal requests directly on L1. The system is then obliged to service this request. Once the force operation is submitted and if the request is serviced, the operation follows the flow of a regular exit.

    1. Forced Operations - StarkEx documentation
    2. Forced Withdrawal - StarkEx documentation
    3. Forced Trade - StarkEx documentation

    Emergency exit

    If the enough time deadline passes and the forced exit is still ignored the user can put the system into a frozen state, disallowing further state updates. In that case everybody can withdraw by submitting a merkle proof of their funds with their L1 transaction.

    1. Forced Operations - StarkEx documentation
    2. Forced Withdrawal - StarkEx documentation
    3. Forced Trade - StarkEx documentation
    Permissions

    Ethereum

    Roles:

    Permissioned to regularly update and prove the state of the L2 on L1.

    Permissioned to manage the Operator role, finalize state and change critical parameters like the programHash, configHash, or message cancellation delay in the core contract.

    Actors:

    ApexAdminMultisig 0xC532…a7B6
    • A Multisig with 2 / 2 threshold.
    • A Governor.
    • Is allowed to interact with StarkPerpetualUSDC - manage the token admin role.
    • Can upgrade the implementation of StarkPerpetualUSDC with 14d delay.

    Participants (2):

    0x22c8…84FeEOA 1
    SHARPVerifierAdminMultisig 0x21F9…AEc4
    • A Multisig with 2 / 4 threshold.
    • Can upgrade the implementation of SHARPVerifierCallProxy.

    Used in:

    • Is allowed to interact with StarkPerpetualUSDC, StarkPerpetualUSDT - Can regsiter new tokens for deposits and withdrawals.
    • An Operator.

    Used in:

    • A Governor.
    • Is allowed to interact with StarkPerpetualUSDT - manage the token admin role.
    • Can upgrade the implementation of StarkPerpetualUSDT with 14d delay.
    • Member of ApexAdminMultisig.
    • A Governor.
    • Is allowed to interact with StarkPerpetualUSDC - manage the token admin role.
    • Can upgrade the implementation of StarkPerpetualUSDC with 14d delay.
    Smart contracts
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture
    A diagram of the smart contract architecture

    Ethereum

    CommitteeUSDC 0x23Ca…94E4

    Data Availability Committee (DAC) contract verifying and storing data availability claims from DAC Members (via a multisignature check). The threshold of valid signatures is 3.

    CommitteeUSDT 0x7249…f800

    Data Availability Committee (DAC) contract verifying and storing data availability claims from DAC Members (via a multisignature check). The threshold of valid signatures is 3.

    Central Validium contract. Receives (verified) state roots from the Operator, allows users to consume L2 -> L1 messages and send L1 -> L2 messages. Critical configuration values for the L2’s logic are defined here by various governance roles. This contract stores the following tokens: USDC.

    Central Validium contract. Receives (verified) state roots from the Operator, allows users to consume L2 -> L1 messages and send L1 -> L2 messages. Critical configuration values for the L2’s logic are defined here by various governance roles. This contract stores the following tokens: USDT.

    Can be upgraded by:

    Upgradable contract through which the SHARPVerifier can be called. This allows SHARPVerifierAdminMultisig to change the otherwise immutable verifier contract with 0s delay.

    Proxy used in:

    SHARPVerifier 0x9fb7…1942

    Shared Starkware SHARP verifier used collectively by Starknet and other SN stack and StarkEx projects. It receives STARK proofs from the Prover and verifies the integrity of the offchain execution including a correctly computed state root which is part of the Program Output.

    Implementation used in:

    FinalizableGpsFactAdapterUSDT 0x40e1…8B22

    Adapter between the core contract and the SHARPVerifierCallProxy. Stores the Cairo programHash (770346231394331402493200980986217737662224545740427952627288191358999988146).

    PerpetualEscapeVerifier 0xaadF…F7BD

    Special verifier for the escape() function.

    FinalizableGpsFactAdapterUSDC 0xE741…B953

    Adapter between the core contract and the SHARPVerifierCallProxy. Stores the Cairo programHash (2530337539466159944237001094809327283009177793361359619481044346150483328860).

    MemoryPageFactRegistry 0xe583…C460

    Auxiliary to the SHARPVerifier contract: Verified ‘memory fact pages’ get stored here. This is important as it registers all necessary onchain data produced by the verifier.

    Implementation used in:

    Value Secured is calculated based on these smart contracts and tokens:

    The current deployment carries some associated risks:

    • Funds can be stolen if a contract receives a malicious code upgrade. There is no delay on code upgrades (CRITICAL).